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CASE NOTES
In selecting the method to be employed in determining the extent of any
special benefit, it appears unrealistic to attempt to determine the cost of
a comparable service. Actually the benefit measured by this test would be
the expense and inconvenience involved in travel to the next nearest library,
hardly a significant benefit. Nor does it appear that the erection of a library
in a neighborhood would be an income producing improvement. While it
might be a limited factor in determining the fair rental value of an apartment
building, this would apply only in certain situations. It thus appears that if
indeed a library does confer any special benefit, it will best be reflected in
property resale value. The determination of amount under this standard will
be properly Ieft to the appraisers.
JAMES P. DOHONEY
Products Liability—Strict Tort Liability—Liability of a Manufacturer
for "Economic Loss."--Seely v. White Motor Co. 1—The plaintiff purchased
a truck from a dealer under a conditional sales contract, The truck had
been manufactured by the defendant who made the following express war-
ranty:
The White Motor Company hereby warrants each new motor
vehicle sold by it to be free from defects in material and workman-
ship under normal use and service, its obligation under the war-
ranty being limited to making good at its factory any part or parts
thereof... 2
Upon taking possession of the truck, the plaintiff found it to be un-
satisfactory because of a violent bouncing effect known as "galloping." For
nearly a year thereafter, the dealer, acting under the guidance and direction
of the manufacturer, attempted unsuccessfully to remedy this defect. Subse-
quently, the brakes failed and the truck was extensively damaged when it
overturned in a non-collision accident. After the plaintiff had repaired this
damage, he notified the dealer that he would make no more payments on
the contract. The dealer consequently repossessed the truck and resold it
for an amount greater than the deficiency.
The plaintiff commenced this action against the manufacturer 3 both
for the damages "related to the accident," namely the cost of the repairs, 4 and
for the damages "unrelated to the accident," the amount paid toward the
purchase price and the profits which had been lost because the truck had
been unfit for normal use. 3 The trial court entered judgment for the plaintiff
for these "unrelated damages" which had arisen independently of the
accident as a result of the defendant's breach of its express warranty.° Re-
1
 45 Cal, Rptr. 17, 403 P.2d 145 (1965).
2
 Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148.	 •
3 The trial court granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss without prejudice to his action
against the dealer. Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148.
4
 Id. at 19-20, 403 P.2d at 147-48.
0 Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148.
6
 Ibid.
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covery was denied, however, as to the cost of the repairs because the trial
court found that there had been no showing of a causal relationship between
the defect and the accident.? Both parties appealed and, in affirming, the
supreme court HELD: failure to replace defective parts as required by an
express warranty constitutes a breach which renders the manufacturer liable
for all the damages naturally arising therefrom.°
The holding and rationale of the instant case are significant only
insofar as they are based upon routine warranty theory rather than upon
the doctrine of strict liability.° Two distinguished jurists wrote lengthy
dicta, however, as to the proper applicability of the strict liability rule, and
it is these dicta which are to be considered here. Chief Justice Traynor,
writing for the majority, explained why the case did not fall within the
strict liability rule" adopted in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc.," and
Justice Peters, while concurring in the result, argued that the Greenman
rationale should have been the basis of recovery here. 12
 There are literally
hundreds of articles13
 in the field of products liability dealing with the
history" as well as the merits'° of the many theories of recovery which have
T Ibid.
8 Ibid.
The court had no difficulty in finding that the defendant had made express
representations to the plaintiff and that his failure to replace the defective parts was a
breach of warranty. Plaintiff's continued demands that the defect be cured were held
to have adequately discharged his obligation to give notice and, simultaneously, to
have given the defendant ample opportunity to perform. Since the warranty was
express, there was no problem of a lack of privity. Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148, citing
Burr v. Sherwin Williams Co., 42 Cal. 2d 682, 268 P.2d 1041 (1954).
The only significant phase of the majority position which is tenuous is its finding
of "reliance" by the plaintiff. Id. at 20, 403 P.2d at 148; see Cal. Civ. Code § 1732. At
the trial, the plaintiff conceded that he had been unaware that the defendant had given
the warranty and that he had relied wholly upon the dealer. The majority held that
this reliance was adequate inasmuch as the plaintiff had relied upon the warranty, In
his concurring opinion, Justice Peters disagreed on the ground that a purchaser does not
rely upon a "mere scrap of paper," but he relies upon a party who will carry out the
obligations of the warranty. Supra note 1, at 24-25, 403 P.2d at 152-53.
It is unlikely that the result here would be significantly altered by the application
of the Uniform Commercial Code rather than the controlling Sales Act. The court's
reasoning on the matter' of reliance would probably yield the same conclusion as to
the Code's "basis of the bargain." Compare U.C.C. § 2-313 (Cal. Commercial Code
§ 2313), with Uniform Sales Act § 12 (Cal. Civ. Code § 1732). Moreover, the measure of
damages should not be significantly different under the Code as Comment 1 to § 2-714
(Cal. Commercial Code § 2744) points out that "in general this section adopts the rule of
the prior uniform statutory provision for measuring damages ... , but goes further to
lay down an explicit provision as to the time and place for determining the loss."
Finally, both the Sales Act § 49 (Cal. Civ. Code § 1769) and the U.C.C. § 2-607 (Cat.
Commercial Code § 2607) require the buyer to give notice to the warrantor within a
reasonable time after he knows or should know of the breach.
io Supra note 1, at 22-23, 403 P.2d at 150-51.
11
 59 Cal. 2d 57, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963).
12
 Supra note 1, at 25-29, 403 P.2d at 153-57.
13
 For the years 1961-1965, the Index to Legal Periodicals lists 202 articles under
"Products Liability."
14
 See, e.g., Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality, and Society, 36 Colum, L. Rev.
699 (1936).
18
 See, e.g., Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel, 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960).
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been advanced." The focus of this note, however, is not upon what
theory ought to be adopted but, rather, upon the refinements and distinctions
which can be made by a jurisdiction which has already opted for the strict
liability doctrine.
In the Greenman case, a consumer brought an action for personal
injuries against the manufacturer of a defective power tool. The California
Supreme Court held that the plaintiff's failure to give notice as required
by the Sales Act" was not a bar to his action." In effect, the court held
that when a consumer is injured by a defective product, the manufacturer
of that product will be held strictly liable in tort without regard to any
rules of warranty. Justice Traynor wrote for a unanimous court that
. . . rules defining and governing warranties that were developed
to meet the needs of commercial transactions cannot properly be
invoked to govern the manufacturer's liability to those injured by
its defective products unless those rules also serve the purposes for
which such liability is imposed."
In order to better understand the implications of the instant case, however,
a different approach to Greenman is necessary.
The court, in Greenman, was forced to make what is essentially a
policy decision. Given the task of providing an effective remedy for the
injured consumer or ultimate user of a defective product, the court rejected
traditional warranty theory as ill-suited for the "purpose."2° Stated in the
most basic terms, the court made the value judgment that the strict liability
doctrine would produce fewer unjust and anomalous results. It is beyond
question, however, that the rule chosen is susceptible of greater differentia-
tion and refinement so that the frequency of such undesirable results will be
diminished still further. This, then, is the fundamental consideration pre-
sented in the instant case: How broadly should the doctrine of strict liability
be applied in order to include all deserving plaintiffs while simultaneously
excluding the maximum number of plaintiffs with tenuous or fraudulent
claims? Put in less abstract terms, the question facing the court in the
instant case was: For what purpose is liability imposed here; that is, should
the Greenman rule be applied in the absence of personal injury?
Justice Traynor indicated a willingness to extend the Greenman rule to
cover physical damage to personal property, but he declined to apply it to
such damages as lost profits and the purchase price, which he classified as
"economic loss."21
 The application of this position in the instant case
means that if the plaintiff had been able to establish the causal relationship
between the defect and the accident, he would have recovered the cost of
16
 For a collection of 29 such theories, see Gillam, Products Liability in a
Nutshell, 37 Ore. L. Rev. 119, 153-55 (1958).
17 Cal. Civ. Code § 1769.
18
 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., supra note 11, at 61-62, 27 Cal. Rptr.
at 699-700, 377 P.2d at 899-900.
la Id. at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901.
20 Ibid.
21
 Supra note 1, at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
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the repairs under the doctrine of strict Iiability; 22 absent a warranty, how-
ever, he could not return the vehicle and demand the refund of his purchase
price.28 Broadly speaking, then, Justice Traynor has sought to limit the
potentially undesirable effects of the strict liability rule by narrowly de-
fining the kinds of damages to which it applies.
Justice Peters, on the other hand, contended that a distinction drawn
on the basis of kinds of damages is invalid and arbitrary. The main thrust
of his position is that the majority have examined the causal chain running
from the existence of a defect to the expenditure of money by the consumer
and have chosen to base their qualifying distinction upon an intermediary
link.24 If the defect in an article causes a personal injury which leads to a
financial loss, the plaintiff can recover. If, however, the same defect in the
same article should only destroy its utility and thus cause a financial loss,
this same plaintiff could not recover except on a warranty. Justice Peters
argued essentially that any distinction between these two causal chains
must be made at the source since, he contended, the effect of Greenman
was to exempt all consumer transactions from the rules of warranty. Once a
particular sale can properly be characterized as a consumer transaction,
damages for any loss caused by a defect are recoverable under strict tort
liability.
Any attempt to evaluate Justice Peters' position must, of course, de-
pend upon the construction of "defect" and of "consumer." When Justice
Traynor considered the question of the defect, he stressed that recovery
on the basis of strict liability here would render the manufacturer ". . . liable
for business losses of other truckers caused by the failure of its trucks to
meet the specific needs of their businesses, even though those needs were
communicated only to the dealer." 25
 This would undoubtedly be true if
"defective" were defined in terms of "fitness for a particular purpose, "28
but Justice Peters pointed out that "defective" must properly be defined
in terms of "merchantability."27 It is this definition of "defective," he
22 Id. at 24, 403 P.2d at 152.
28
 Id. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
24 Id. at 25-26, 403 P.2d at 153-54.
25 Id. at 22, 403 P.2d at 150.
28
 Id. at 28, 403 P.2d at 156; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-315 which provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particu-
lar purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on
the seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
excluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
27 Supra note 1, at 28, 403 P.2d at 156; see, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-314 which provides:
(1) Unless excluded or modified (Section 2-316), a warranty that the
goods shall be merchantable is implied in a contract for their sale if the seller
is a merchant with respect to goods of that kind....
(2) Goods to be merchantable must be at least such as
(a) pass without objection in the trade under the contract description;
and
(b) in the case of fungible goods, are of fair average quality within
the description; and
(c) are fit for the ordinary purposes for which' such goods are used;
and
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argued, which will adequately protect against a too sweeping application of
the strict liability rule." Conceding that such a construction may be diffi-
cult to implement in particular cases, it must be noted that this same diffi-
culty inheres in any attempt to distinguish between a warranty of merchant-
ability and a warranty of fitness for a particular purpose.
The second and more perplexing problem encountered in appraising
Justice Peters' position involves the definition of the class of plaintiffs to
which it would be applied. How will the courts decide who is a consumer?
While Justice Peters conceded that this was a "close case," he would classify
this plaintiff as an "ordinary consumer . . . [since] he was the final link in
the marketing chain, having no more bargaining power than does the
usual individual who purchases a motor vehicle on the retail level." 29 In his
view, then, a person who purchases a product for use, and thus terminates
the marketing chain, is a consumer, and all his remedies flow from strict
tort liability rather than from the rules of warranty.
While this ordinary consumer test is superficially attractive, a deeper
analysis is essential to an accurate evaluation of its validity. Conceding that
Justice Peters is correct that any distinction must be drawn on the basis
of the nature of the transaction, it is submitted that a distinction expressed
in terms of damages can flow directly from just such a transactional
dichotomy. This is to say that a distinction may be drawn within a transac-
tion, for the transaction may be separated into its component elements. When
the consumer goes to buy goods on the basis of personal utility, he is ordi-
narily seeking to break even—to get his money's worth. When, however, this
same consumer considers the purchase of this same product in terms of
commercial utility, he is seeking something more than value for value—he is
seeking it as a means to a profit.
Given this distinction, it is not unreasonable to conclude that when
the buyer is engaged in this commercial element of the transaction, he
ought to bear the risks of doing business." Admittedly, he may not have
the same "bargaining power" available to use in dealing with them, but
they are nonetheless the same risks borne by all who engage in a commercial
enterprise.9 ' What is suggested here is simply that a denial of recovery
for "economic losses" is but a facile manner of expressing a distinction based
upon the discrete elements of a single transaction. The better approach
would not deny recovery to consumers for certain kinds of losses but would
merely recognize that, properly defined, consumers do not suffer this kind of
harm. On the other hand, small businessmen would not be entitled to
(d) run, within the variations permitted by the agreement, of even
kind, quality and quantity within each unit and among all units
involved; and
(e) are adequately contained, packaged, and labeled as the agreement
may require; and
(f) conform to the promises or affirmations of fact made on the con-
tainer or label if any.
28 Supra note 1, at 28, 403 P.2d at 156.
29
 Id. at 29-30, 403 P.2d at 157-58.
so Cf. id. at 23, 403 P.2d at 151.
81 Cf. id. at 23-24, 403 P.2d at 151-52.
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assert their lack of "bargaining power" as a ground for pursuing this non-
commercial remedy. In the instant case, then, the plaintiff was properly
restricted to the rules of warranty for his recovery because his losses arose
from the commercial side of the transaction. In terms of Greenman, the
"purpose," or more precisely the reason, for which liability is imposed here
is the law's enforcement of an obligation freely undertaken. What is sug-
gested here, then, is that Justice Peters' view can be implemented, without
the "horrible consequences" predicted by the majority, if, but only if, the
terms are clearly and precisely defined. It is submitted that Justice Peters
has resolved the problem of "defective" but that the critical question of a
proper construction of "consumer" has not received a satisfactory response.
In this respect, consider the hypothetical case posed by Justice Peters
at the close of his opinion.32 According to his reading of the majority
opinion, a housewife who bought a refrigerator with such a defect as to
render it useless would have no remedy against the manufacturer except on
an express warranty. Such a result is not easily defended, and under his
position in the instant case, Justice Peters would grant recovery to the
homeowner. This was basically the case presented in Santor v. A & M
Karagkeusian, Inc." wherein a homeowner bought carpeting from a retailer
who later went out of business. The carpeting was defective and the home-
owner brought an action for its value against the manufacturer. The New
Jersey Supreme Court affirmed a judgment for the plaintiff based upon a
breach of an implied warranty of merchantability notwithstanding the lack
of privity. The court went on to say, however, that the recovery could have
been based upon strict tort liability despite the fact that no one had been
physically injured:
As we have indicated, the strict liability in tort formulation
of the nature of the manufacturer's burden to expected consumers
of his product represents a sound solution to an evergrowing pro-
blem, and we accept it as applicable in this jurisdiction. And, al-
though the doctrine has been applied principally in connection with
personal injuries sustained by expected users from products which
are dangerous when defective, we reiterate . . . that the responsi-
bility of the maker should be no different. where damage to the
article sold or to other property of the consumer is involved. . . . In
this era of complex marketing practices and assembly line manu-
facturing conditions, restrictive notions of privity of contract be-
tween manufacturer and consumer must be put aside and the realis-
tic view of strict tort liability adopted.34 (Emphasis added.)
Justice Peters cited this opinion in support of his position while the majority,
in effect, rejected Santor as wrongly decided." Under the approach sug-
32 Id. at 30, 403 P.2d at 158.
83 44 N.J. 52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965).
84 Id. at 66, 207 A.2d at 312, citing Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid
Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363, 181 N.E.2d 399 (1962).
35 The majority felt that the decision should have been based solely on the de-
fendant's representations that the carpeting was Grade #1. Supra note 1, at 23, 403
P.2d at 151.
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gested in this note, however, Santor is inapposite because the plaintiff in the
instant case cannot properly be characterized as a consumer.
It is quite possible, then, that a good deal of the difficulty on the
question of damages can be attributed to the equation of the terms "eco-
nomic" and "commercial." While consumers do have "economic losses," they
cannot, by definition, suffer "commercial losses." This terminology would
preserve the fundamental effect of Greenman which recognized that ". . . the
liability is not one governed by the law of contract warranties but by the
law of strict liability in tort."3° (Emphasis added.)
Under traditional tort theory, the "harm" is an independent step be-
tween the causative force (here the defect) and the ultimate "economic loss."
Ordinarily, then, the diminished utility of a defective product would not be
classified as this kind of tortious harm. Under the approach suggested here,
however, it is enough that the "economic loss" results directly from the
presence of the defect. This kind of result might appear to many to be un-
desirable or perhaps unjustifiable. It is submitted, however, that a con-
sistent and orderly application of the rationale of Greenman can yield no
other. An aversion to this result might well be grounds to resist any adoption
of the strict liability doctrine. It should not, however, be grounds to apply
the doctrine according to an evaluation of the needs of various plaintiffs. The
meaning of "defect" and of "consumer" can certainly be drawn narrowly,
but they ought not to be drawn artificially. If, then, the definition of "de-
fective" is restricted to goods which are truly unmerchantable and if the
term "consumer" is defined according to the nature of the transaction and
not according to a judicial appraisal of "bargaining power," the Greenman
rule can safely be given its natural effect. One who buys goods for commer-
cial use or resale must look solely to the rules of warranty for his remedy
if the goods are defective. On the other hand, one who buys for personal use
will not be restricted to a warranty action but he will be entitled to pursue
the non-commercial remedy of strict tort liability for all the damages caused
by a defect. The effect of the approach suggested here is simply to give to
the consumer an alternative remedy on the ground that he is often prejudiced
by the technical rules of warranty. The warranty rules which are necessary
for the orderly conduct of commercial affairs will thus not leave the "non-
commercial" plaintiff entirely without a remedy.
GERALD F. PETRUCCELLI, JR.
Trade Regulation—Section 5 of Federal Trade Commission Act—"Free"
Articles.—FTC v. Mary Carter Paint Co. 1—Mary Carter manufactures
and sells paint. For ten years it advertised, as its permanent policy, that for
every can of paint purchased, it would give the buyer a "free" can of equal
quality and quantity. Prior to this advertisement, however, it had never sold
30
 Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., supra note 11, at 63, 27 Cal. Rptr. at
701, 377 P.2d at 901.
1
 382 U.S. 46 (1965).
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